eral rule, the doctrine of assumption of the risk, with its attendant "complexities" and "difficulties," has been supplanted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly's adoption of a system of recovery based on comparative fault in the Comparative Negligence Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §7102(a)-(b). Where plaintiff tried to minimize her risk of falling, but fell nevertheless, she did not voluntarily assume the risk of falling. Barrett v. Fredavid Builders, Inc., 685 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. 1996).

Finally, in Giosa v. School District of Philadelphia, 630 A.2d 511 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), defendant argued that the plaintiff assumed the risk of slipping on an i

Defendants may contend that plaintiff assumed the risk of an accident. The burden of showing voluntary assumption of risk and contributory negligence is on the defendants. Whitley v. Philadelphia Transportation Company, 234 A. 2d 922, 925 (Pa. Super. 1967).

The doctrine of assumption of risk “has been very problematic and has fallen from the favor of some of the judiciary and legal commentators. In fact, the doctrine as a separate affirmative defense has only narrowly survived abolishment by our Supreme Court.” Bullman v. Giuntoli, PICS No. 00-1904.

The assumption of risk defense is made out only by showing that a person "with appreciation and knowledge of an obvious danger, purposely elects to abandon a position of relative safety and chooses to reposition himself in a place of obvious danger and by reason of that repositioning is injured." McIntyre v. Cusick, 372 A. 2d 864, 866 (Pa. Super. 1977)."

The defense of assumption of the risk will not prevent recovery unless the evidence conclusively establishes that the plaintiff was subjectively aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it. Barrett v. Fredavid Builders, Inc., 685 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. 1996). Voluntariness is established only when the circumstances manifest a willingness to accept the risk. Staub v. Toy Factory, Inc., 749 A.2d 522 (Pa. Super. 2000). Mere contributory negligence does not establish assumption of the risk. Id.

Rather, a plaintiff has assumed the risk where he has gone so far as to abandon his right to complain and has absolved the defendant from taking any responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. In order to prevail on assumption of risk, the defendant must establish both the “awareness of the risk” prong and the “voluntariness” prong. Id.

The defense is not available unless it is beyond question, such that no two reasonable minds could differ, that the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly proceeded in the face of an obvious and dangerous condition. Hardy v. Southland Corp., 645 A. 2d 839 (Pa. Super. 1994), citing, Howell v. Clyde, 620 A. 2d 1107 (Pa. 1993). Assumption of the risk cannot be used as a defense unless it is shown that plaintiff "must have appreciated the danger itself and the nature, character and extent which made it unreasonable." Crance v. Sohanic, 496 A. 2d 1230, 1232 (Pa. Super. 1985).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 762 A.2d 399 (Pa. 2000), discussed the status of the doctrine of assumption of risk in light of the passage of the comparative negligence statute and stated that as a general rule, the doctrine of assumption of the risk, with its attendant "complexities" and "difficulties," has been supplanted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly's adoption of a system of recovery based on comparative fault in the Comparative Negligence Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §7102(a)-(b). Where plaintiff tried to minimize her risk of falling, but fell nevertheless, she did not voluntarily assume the risk of falling. Barrett v. Fredavid Builders, Inc., 685 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. 1996).

Finally, in Giosa v. School District of Philadelphia, 630 A.2d 511 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), defendant argued that the plaintiff assumed the risk of slipping on an ic

eciation and knowledge of an obvious danger, purposely elects to abandon a position of relative safety and chooses to reposition himself in a place of obvious danger and by reason of that repositioning is injured." McIntyre v. Cusick, 372 A. 2d 864, 866 (Pa. Super. 1977)."

The defense of assumption of the risk will not prevent recovery unless the evidence conclusively establishes that the plaintiff was subjectively aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it. Barrett v. Fredavid Builders, Inc., 685 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. 1996). Voluntariness is established only when the circumstances manifest a willingness to accept the risk. Staub v. Toy Factory, Inc., 749 A.2d 522 (Pa. Super. 2000). Mere contributory negligence does not establish assumption of the risk. Id.

Rather, a plaintiff has assumed the risk where he has gone so far as to abandon his right to complain and has absolved the defendant from taking any responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. In order to prevail on assumption of risk, the defendant must establish both the “awareness of the risk” prong and the “voluntariness” prong. Id.

The defense is not available unless it is beyond question, such that no two reasonable minds could differ, that the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly proceeded in the face of an obvious and dangerous condition. Hardy v. Southland Corp., 645 A. 2d 839 (Pa. Super. 1994), citing, Howell v. Clyde, 620 A. 2d 1107 (Pa. 1993). Assumption of the risk cannot be used as a defense unless it is shown that plaintiff "must have appreciated the danger itself and the nature, character and extent which made it unreasonable." Crance v. Sohanic, 496 A. 2d 1230, 1232 (Pa. Super. 1985).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 762 A.2d 399 (Pa. 2000), discussed the status of the doctrine of assumption of risk in light of the passage of the comparative negligence statute and stated that as a general rule, the doctrine of assumption of the risk, with its attendant "complexities" and "difficulties," has been supplanted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly's adoption of a system of recovery based on comparative fault in the Comparative Negligence Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §7102(a)-(b). Where plaintiff tried to minimize her risk of falling, but fell nevertheless, she did not voluntarily assume the risk of falling. Barrett v. Fredavid Builders, Inc., 685 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. 1996).

Finally, in Giosa v. School District of Philadelphia, 630 A.2d 511 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), defendant argued that the plaintiff assumed the risk of slipping on an i

Factory, Inc., 749 A.2d 522 (Pa. Super. 2000). Mere contributory negligence does not establish assumption of the risk. Id.

Rather, a plaintiff has assumed the risk where he has gone so far as to abandon his right to complain and has absolved the defendant from taking any responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. In order to prevail on assumption of risk, the defendant must establish both the “awareness of the risk” prong and the “voluntariness” prong. Id.

The defense is not available unless it is beyond question, such that no two reasonable minds could differ, that the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly proceeded in the face of an obvious and dangerous condition. Hardy v. Southland Corp., 645 A. 2d 839 (Pa. Super. 1994), citing, Howell v. Clyde, 620 A. 2d 1107 (Pa. 1993). Assumption of the risk cannot be used as a defense unless it is shown that plaintiff "must have appreciated the danger itself and the nature, character and extent which made it unreasonable." Crance v. Sohanic, 496 A. 2d 1230, 1232 (Pa. Super. 1985).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 762 A.2d 399 (Pa. 2000), discussed the status of the doctrine of assumption of risk in light of the passage of the comparative negligence statute and stated that as a general rule, the doctrine of assumption of the risk, with its attendant "complexities" and "difficulties," has been supplanted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly's adoption of a system of recovery based on comparative fault in the Comparative Negligence Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §7102(a)-(b). Where plaintiff tried to minimize her risk of falling, but fell nevertheless, she did not voluntarily assume the risk of falling. Barrett v. Fredavid Builders, Inc., 685 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. 1996).

Finally, in Giosa v. School District of Philadelphia, 630 A.2d 511 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), defendant argued that the plaintiff assumed the risk of slipping on an i

ce of an obvious and dangerous condition. Hardy v. Southland Corp., 645 A. 2d 839 (Pa. Super. 1994), citing, Howell v. Clyde, 620 A. 2d 1107 (Pa. 1993). Assumption of the risk cannot be used as a defense unless it is shown that plaintiff "must have appreciated the danger itself and the nature, character and extent which made it unreasonable." Crance v. Sohanic, 496 A. 2d 1230, 1232 (Pa. Super. 1985).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 762 A.2d 399 (Pa. 2000), discussed the status of the doctrine of assumption of risk in light of the passage of the comparative negligence statute and stated that as a general rule, the doctrine of assumption of the risk, with its attendant "complexities" and "difficulties," has been supplanted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly's adoption of a system of recovery based on comparative fault in the Comparative Negligence Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §7102(a)-(b). Where plaintiff tried to minimize her risk of falling, but fell nevertheless, she did not voluntarily assume the risk of falling. Barrett v. Fredavid Builders, Inc., 685 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. 1996).

Finally, in Giosa v. School District of Philadelphia, 630 A.2d 511 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), defendant argued that the plaintiff assumed the risk of slipping on an i

eral rule, the doctrine of assumption of the risk, with its attendant "complexities" and "difficulties," has been supplanted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly's adoption of a system of recovery based on comparative fault in the Comparative Negligence Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §7102(a)-(b). Where plaintiff tried to minimize her risk of falling, but fell nevertheless, she did not voluntarily assume the risk of falling. Barrett v. Fredavid Builders, Inc., 685 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. 1996).

Finally, in Giosa v. School District of Philadelphia, 630 A.2d 511 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), defendant argued that the plaintiff assumed the risk of slipping on an icy sidewalk, “because Giosa fully understood the risk involved in walking on the sidewalk, and yet voluntarily chose to encounter it.” Id. The Court held that since defendant owed plaintiff, a member of the general public, a duty to keep the public sidewalks clear from any dangerous conditions, the doctrine of assumption of risk did not apply. Id. Similarly, defendants owed plaintiff, Fran Kellenbenz, as a member of the general public, a duty to keep their sidewalk clear from any dangerous conditions. Similarly, the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply and the Court should not charge the jury thereon.