w the two parties to put aside their basic conflict. The U.S. troop surge, with uncertain prospects, does not constitute such a situation.

Second, Iran might well benefit from a continuation of the present indecisive situation in Iraq. After all, if the U.S. is tied down there, the appetite among the Americ

On May 22, 2007, The Guardian reported that some U.S. officials have asserted that Iran is covertly building a relationship with Al Qaeda and other Sunni insurgents aimed at launching a summer offensive to thwart the possibility of progress from the ongoing U.S. troop surge. In the face of such an offensive, the U.S. officials argue, Iran believes Congressional support for a continued U.S. presence in Iraq would collapse. Then, the U.S. troops would be withdrawn. Following the U.S. withdrawal, Iran would have succeeded in its proxy war against the United States and would be in a position to dominate the broken Iraqi state and project its growing power beyond Iraq’s borders. Even as they argued for such a scenario, the U.S. officials failed to offer specific and credible evidence of such an emerging relationship. In the absence of such evidence, historic experience, the region’s dynamics, and Iran’s national interest, all argue against an Iran-Al Qaeda relationship.

First, Al Qaeda views Iran's Shia-led theocracy as a “heretic regime.” Its leaders have repeatedly assailed Shia Islam as illegitimate. These fundamental differences make such a relationship highly unlikely except under extraordinary circumstances that would allow the two parties to put aside their basic conflict. The U.S. troop surge, with uncertain prospects, does not constitute such a situation.

Second, Iran might well benefit from a continuation of the present indecisive situation in Iraq. After all, if the U.S. is tied down there, the appetite among the Americ

e, the U.S. officials argue, Iran believes Congressional support for a continued U.S. presence in Iraq would collapse. Then, the U.S. troops would be withdrawn. Following the U.S. withdrawal, Iran would have succeeded in its proxy war against the United States and would be in a position to dominate the broken Iraqi state and project its growing power beyond Iraq’s borders. Even as they argued for such a scenario, the U.S. officials failed to offer specific and credible evidence of such an emerging relationship. In the absence of such evidence, historic experience, the region’s dynamics, and Iran’s national interest, all argue against an Iran-Al Qaeda relationship.

First, Al Qaeda views Iran's Shia-led theocracy as a “heretic regime.” Its leaders have repeatedly assailed Shia Islam as illegitimate. These fundamental differences make such a relationship highly unlikely except under extraordinary circumstances that would allow the two parties to put aside their basic conflict. The U.S. troop surge, with uncertain prospects, does not constitute such a situation.

Second, Iran might well benefit from a continuation of the present indecisive situation in Iraq. After all, if the U.S. is tied down there, the appetite among the Americ

qi state and project its growing power beyond Iraq’s borders. Even as they argued for such a scenario, the U.S. officials failed to offer specific and credible evidence of such an emerging relationship. In the absence of such evidence, historic experience, the region’s dynamics, and Iran’s national interest, all argue against an Iran-Al Qaeda relationship.

First, Al Qaeda views Iran's Shia-led theocracy as a “heretic regime.” Its leaders have repeatedly assailed Shia Islam as illegitimate. These fundamental differences make such a relationship highly unlikely except under extraordinary circumstances that would allow the two parties to put aside their basic conflict. The U.S. troop surge, with uncertain prospects, does not constitute such a situation.

Second, Iran might well benefit from a continuation of the present indecisive situation in Iraq. After all, if the U.S. is tied down there, the appetite among the Americ

argue against an Iran-Al Qaeda relationship.

First, Al Qaeda views Iran's Shia-led theocracy as a “heretic regime.” Its leaders have repeatedly assailed Shia Islam as illegitimate. These fundamental differences make such a relationship highly unlikely except under extraordinary circumstances that would allow the two parties to put aside their basic conflict. The U.S. troop surge, with uncertain prospects, does not constitute such a situation.

Second, Iran might well benefit from a continuation of the present indecisive situation in Iraq. After all, if the U.S. is tied down there, the appetite among the Americ

w the two parties to put aside their basic conflict. The U.S. troop surge, with uncertain prospects, does not constitute such a situation.

Second, Iran might well benefit from a continuation of the present indecisive situation in Iraq. After all, if the U.S. is tied down there, the appetite among the American public for any additional military action would be low. Furthermore, such a situation would limit the feasibility of military options against Iran. The proximity of substantial U.S. manpower that could be targeted under any Iranian retaliation would allow Iran to increase its ability to deter the risk of U.S. military action. As such, the current instability and presence of U.S. troops in Iraq may give Iran an “insurance policy” of sorts against U.S. military strikes there.

Third, the present instability in Iraq has increased geopolitical risks throughout the Middle East. Such heightened risk is profitable for Iran. This elevated risk has translated into a premium on crude oil prices. With revenue from the sale of crude oil amounting to 80% of Iranian export income, Iran benefits substantially from higher crude oil prices. Therefore, a continuation of "managed chaos” in Iraq may well be preferable, at this time, to a decisive outcome as far as Iranian interests are concerned.

Fourth, in a number of regions in Iraq, Sunnis have turned on Al Qaeda. This fairly recent development would preclude a grand Iranian-Al Qaeda-Sunni front. The sectarian rivalry between Iraq’s Shia and Sunnis would also undermine prospects for Shia-l