lection looming in 2008.

As before, we are liable to see a chimera ... a desert mirage of sorts involving an appearance of success in the short term. As was the case with earlier efforts by the US military, the appearance of order gradually gives way to chaos as ethnic rivalries resurface. So long as the Iraqi forces continue to demonstrate divided loyalties and in many instances a willingness to collude with the insurgents, there is little chance that the conditions established by this counterinsurgency strategy will show long term progress.

The Iraqi government i

The belief expressed by some in the Bush administration that the troop surge will help create the conditions for a more stable society in Iraq and for greater long-term security is far-fetched. This is naive thinking and risks repeating blunders we have seen in the past.

One thing has become clear about the Iraqi position over the course of this war - the Iraqi people don't take kindly to having plans implemented on their behalf. Come what may they generally end up doing it their way no matter how ugly and messy it gets in the interim.

Let's assume US forces succeed in clearing out the gangs of Sunni and Shia insurgents that have been running their operations out of neighborhoods in Baghdad. What will be achieved? A society that will then proceed to develop in Bush's preordained direction?

This won't happen for the simple reason that American logic is incapable of parsing local wisdom and priorities that don't easily blend with Western style pragmatism. Moreover the internecine complexities of Iraqi society won't simply "shape up", especially on the basis of a plan that is being imported, and to some extent imposed by outside agents.

This escalation by the US military would seem to be yet more military theater. Once Baghdad districts are cleared and secured, the Americans will eventually be obliged to hand over control to Iraqi forces. Anyone who knows about the current state of the Iraqi army can be excused for being downright cynical when presented with the prospect of these forces holding ground and maintaining order under pressure from insurgents. As we know from past examples the insurgents never simply disappear, they just go to ground and resurface as soon as the American "act" of the play is over. This was exactly what happened during the last surge in Baghdad involving 7,000 American troops - Operation Forward Together. Once the Americans handed control back to the Iraqi military, the controls that had been put in place began to unravel and the insurgents moved back in.

The insurgents have time on their side. They can easily wait out this US surge, while building up strength for a later return. Meanwhile the Americans have no such luxury. They have to be successful within a year or public support will plummet. Not a good prospect for Republicans with an election looming in 2008.

As before, we are liable to see a chimera ... a desert mirage of sorts involving an appearance of success in the short term. As was the case with earlier efforts by the US military, the appearance of order gradually gives way to chaos as ethnic rivalries resurface. So long as the Iraqi forces continue to demonstrate divided loyalties and in many instances a willingness to collude with the insurgents, there is little chance that the conditions established by this counterinsurgency strategy will show long term progress.

The Iraqi government it

d in clearing out the gangs of Sunni and Shia insurgents that have been running their operations out of neighborhoods in Baghdad. What will be achieved? A society that will then proceed to develop in Bush's preordained direction?

This won't happen for the simple reason that American logic is incapable of parsing local wisdom and priorities that don't easily blend with Western style pragmatism. Moreover the internecine complexities of Iraqi society won't simply "shape up", especially on the basis of a plan that is being imported, and to some extent imposed by outside agents.

This escalation by the US military would seem to be yet more military theater. Once Baghdad districts are cleared and secured, the Americans will eventually be obliged to hand over control to Iraqi forces. Anyone who knows about the current state of the Iraqi army can be excused for being downright cynical when presented with the prospect of these forces holding ground and maintaining order under pressure from insurgents. As we know from past examples the insurgents never simply disappear, they just go to ground and resurface as soon as the American "act" of the play is over. This was exactly what happened during the last surge in Baghdad involving 7,000 American troops - Operation Forward Together. Once the Americans handed control back to the Iraqi military, the controls that had been put in place began to unravel and the insurgents moved back in.

The insurgents have time on their side. They can easily wait out this US surge, while building up strength for a later return. Meanwhile the Americans have no such luxury. They have to be successful within a year or public support will plummet. Not a good prospect for Republicans with an election looming in 2008.

As before, we are liable to see a chimera ... a desert mirage of sorts involving an appearance of success in the short term. As was the case with earlier efforts by the US military, the appearance of order gradually gives way to chaos as ethnic rivalries resurface. So long as the Iraqi forces continue to demonstrate divided loyalties and in many instances a willingness to collude with the insurgents, there is little chance that the conditions established by this counterinsurgency strategy will show long term progress.

The Iraqi government i

s.

This escalation by the US military would seem to be yet more military theater. Once Baghdad districts are cleared and secured, the Americans will eventually be obliged to hand over control to Iraqi forces. Anyone who knows about the current state of the Iraqi army can be excused for being downright cynical when presented with the prospect of these forces holding ground and maintaining order under pressure from insurgents. As we know from past examples the insurgents never simply disappear, they just go to ground and resurface as soon as the American "act" of the play is over. This was exactly what happened during the last surge in Baghdad involving 7,000 American troops - Operation Forward Together. Once the Americans handed control back to the Iraqi military, the controls that had been put in place began to unravel and the insurgents moved back in.

The insurgents have time on their side. They can easily wait out this US surge, while building up strength for a later return. Meanwhile the Americans have no such luxury. They have to be successful within a year or public support will plummet. Not a good prospect for Republicans with an election looming in 2008.

As before, we are liable to see a chimera ... a desert mirage of sorts involving an appearance of success in the short term. As was the case with earlier efforts by the US military, the appearance of order gradually gives way to chaos as ethnic rivalries resurface. So long as the Iraqi forces continue to demonstrate divided loyalties and in many instances a willingness to collude with the insurgents, there is little chance that the conditions established by this counterinsurgency strategy will show long term progress.

The Iraqi government i

is over. This was exactly what happened during the last surge in Baghdad involving 7,000 American troops - Operation Forward Together. Once the Americans handed control back to the Iraqi military, the controls that had been put in place began to unravel and the insurgents moved back in.

The insurgents have time on their side. They can easily wait out this US surge, while building up strength for a later return. Meanwhile the Americans have no such luxury. They have to be successful within a year or public support will plummet. Not a good prospect for Republicans with an election looming in 2008.

As before, we are liable to see a chimera ... a desert mirage of sorts involving an appearance of success in the short term. As was the case with earlier efforts by the US military, the appearance of order gradually gives way to chaos as ethnic rivalries resurface. So long as the Iraqi forces continue to demonstrate divided loyalties and in many instances a willingness to collude with the insurgents, there is little chance that the conditions established by this counterinsurgency strategy will show long term progress.

The Iraqi government i

lection looming in 2008.

As before, we are liable to see a chimera ... a desert mirage of sorts involving an appearance of success in the short term. As was the case with earlier efforts by the US military, the appearance of order gradually gives way to chaos as ethnic rivalries resurface. So long as the Iraqi forces continue to demonstrate divided loyalties and in many instances a willingness to collude with the insurgents, there is little chance that the conditions established by this counterinsurgency strategy will show long term progress.

The Iraqi government itself is no more dependable than its military arm. The government of Nuri al-Maliki has been sending mixed messages on its willingness to implement the US plan. The Shi'ite operational commander for Baghdad selected by al-Maliki is a little known Lt. General named Aboud Qanbar. There is a strategy to twin American and Iraqi officers in an operational chain-of-command. This move may well complicate an already complicated task. American forces tend to perform best under direct operational control, so this strategy could well give rise to frustrations, with a potential for internal conflicts.

It remains to be seen how far al-Maliki will go on his apparent readiness to take on Shia militias. A few months ago this scenario seemed unlikely since the PM owes his political rise to leaders such as Muqtada al Sadr. His willingness to target key Shia militias risks leaving him politically isolated, or worse - a target himself. On the other hand many army and police units are now predominantly Shi'ite in composition, many with loyalties to the Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade. This make civilian militias seem increasingly like renegade elements.

I don't believe that a military escalation will "win" it for Bush. At best it may help to create an appearance of work-in-progress as America heads toward the 2008 election campaign. Real stability and genuine progress can only be brokered by Iraqis themselves, and until they are ready to make that arrangement there will almost certainly be more civil conflict in the future.

The larger lesson here, is that the uploading of democracy on the back of military intervention doesn't work when the targeted society operates with a mindset so different from the American-world-view, it almost amounts to a parallel reality.

Now that an internal power struggle has been unleashed in Iraq, it is doubtful that a time-restricted American counterinsurgency will do anything except postpone the inevitable.